Dr. Russell Norman Murray©

Calvin on Augustine (PhD Edit)

2012-02-01T07:31:00.012-08:00

Arundel Castle, West Sussex (trekearth.com)

January 26, 2012

An interesting and somewhat controversial section from my PhD thesis below. I have noted previously I have found Augustine, at least translated into English, how I read him, difficult to read and quite repetitive to work through. I am not doubting his historical greatness as a philosopher and theologian, but I think my point stands.

The confusion for the better part of 2, 000 years whether or not Augustine is a compatibilist like Calvin, Feinberg and me and many in the Reformed camp that hold to a very strong view on God's sovereignty, or is an incompatiblist like Plantinga and many evangelicals that hold to various forms of libertarian free will demonstrates this confusion.

It should be pointed out that there is a good amount of agreement with these views on some points that could add to the confusion at times. This is because they are both, even though one uses compatibilism and the other incompatibilism, within Christian Biblical/theological orthodoxy, whereas John Hick's theodicy, for example, primarily would not be.

Definition of Incompatibilism/Compatibilism

Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions) or simultaneous (at the same time) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise. Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

Calvin on Augustine

I include this section because as Augustine is listed as a forefather of free will theodicy,[1] as his ancient view would be considered incompatibilistic according to modern philosophy.[2] Calvin, however, throughout The Bondage and Liberation of the Will claims that Augustine supports his case for a free will theory in which human beings are in bondage to sin, unable to follow God on their own.[3] As an academic I cannot, in good conscience, use both Augustine and Calvin in this thesis without dealing with this matter.[4] As Augustine wrote a free will theodicy,[5] which included the idea that human beings require the ability to freely choose or reject God, in order to please the Almighty.[6]

A.N.S. Lane (1996) notes that one problem with Calvin and his use of Augustine was Calvin rejected the use of the term free choice.[7] Calvin did state that although he rejected the term,[8] he believed his views to be in line with Augustine on human free will, that the will was free in the sense that it was not coerced but voluntary and self-determined.[9] Lane states that after centuries of debates between Catholic and Protestant scholars, many concluded Calvin correctly understood Augustine.[10]

When reading Augustine’s theodicy, it appears to be supporting incompatibilism as human beings are noted to have the ability to freely choose or reject God.[11] He states that a human being could not act rightly unless he/she willed to do so,[12] and to do that the person must have free will in order to act rightly.[13] Calvin notes that this concept of free choice by Augustine would not be applicable to a fallen will, and could only be applied to Adam and Eve before the fall in Genesis occurred.[14] This point by Calvin, however, was never clearly demonstrated in Augustine’s writings; instead, Augustine has been viewed historically as a theologian who held to free will theory[15] within incompatibilist freedom in modern terms, and a strong view of God’s sovereignty.[16]

Feinberg believes that Augustine was not the ancient equivalent of a modern compatibilist,[17] but made the error of writing a theodicy, which featured free will and incompatibilist thought, and yet held to a theory of God’s sovereignty, which would necessitate some type of determinism.[18] It would seem Augustine either made a logical error in accepting the ancient equivalents of incompatibilist human free choice and compatibilist sovereignty for God,[19] or he simply failed to adequately explain the connection in particular whether or not his free will theodicy applied equally to pre-fall and post-fall humanity.[20] Lane points out that Calvin, in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, lacked the library resources needed and loosely quoted Augustine.[21] Calvin was familiar with Augustine’s traditionally strong view of God’s sovereignty,[22] and perhaps he rightly or wrongly interpreted that sovereignty as applying to Augustine’s concept of free will.[23] I would postulate in agreement with Feinberg that Augustine’s free will theodicy appears to be incompatibilistic in regard to human free will and is likely compatibilistic in regard to God’s sovereignty.[24] The connection between the two concepts seems not to be adequately explained by Augustine.[25]

Rowan A. Greer states that it was realized by Augustine there was a difficulty holding to free will theodicy and a strong view of God’s sovereignty.[26] Greer concluded that Augustine always maintained a free will approach,[27] and held that God had sovereign control in the universe to punish evildoers.[28] Greer thought Augustine’s solution to the problem that his free will theodicy perhaps contradicted his views on sovereignty, would be to restrict the concept of free will to Adam and Eve before the fall.[29] It should be pointed out that this is Greer’s assumption[30] and, although it agrees with Calvin’s idea,[31] Greer speculates that Augustine viewed his free will idea as appropriate for Adam and Eve before the fall, and not for humanity after it.[32] Greer however, like Calvin,[33] was not able to produce a distinct Augustine reference that stated this, and so in my mind this supports the idea that it is still unknown whether or not Augustine, when discussing this idea of human freedom, was including post-fall humanity in that concept.[34] It is therefore reasonable to deduce that Augustine quite possibly held that fallen humanity still had some ability to freely choose and reject God,[35] which would place him in the incompatibilism camp in regard to human free choice.[36]

Regardless of Calvin’s views,[37] in modern scholarship Augustine and his free will theodicy are primarily reviewed within incompatibilist camp.[38]

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GREER, ROWAN A. (1996) ‘Augustine’s Transformation of The Free Will Defence’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 13, Number 4, October, pp. 471-486. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

LANE, A.N.S. (1543)(1996) ‘Introduction’, in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, by John Calvin, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

MCCANN, HUGH J. (2001) ‘Sovereignty and Freedom: A Reply to Rowe’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 18, Number 1, January, pp. 110-116. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

PETERSON, MICHAEL, WILLIAM HASKER, BRUCE REICHENBACH, AND DAVID BASINGER (1996)(eds.), ‘Introduction: Saint Augustine: Evil is Privation of Good’, in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

[1] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).

[2] McCann (2001: 115). Geisler (1986: 75).

[3] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95-96).

[4] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95-96).

[5] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).

[6] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 37).

[7] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xix).

[8] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xix). Calvin (1543)(1996: 103).

[9] Calvin (1543)(1996: 103).

[10] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiv).

[11] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).

[12] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).

[13] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).

[14] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95).

[15] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).

[16] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[17] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[18] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[19] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[20] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[21] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[22] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Greer (1996: 481).

[23] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[24] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[25] Feinberg (1994: 98). Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[26] Greer (1996: 481).

[27] Greer (1996: 481).

[28] Greer (1996: 481).

[29] Greer (1996: 481).

[30] Greer (1996: 481).

[31] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[32] Greer (1996: 481). Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[33] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[34] Greer (1996: 481). Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[35] Feinberg (1994: 98). Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[36] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[37] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[38] Therefore Augustine is primarily reviewed as such.

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C.S. Lewis and Thoughts on Total Depravity

2012-01-03T19:30:00.004-08:00

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Usually I present one post a month, but since the response has been good for the December/January post I present a second short January article. I did state that I would consider this as an option in the past based on comments/interaction/emails/pageviews. Cheers. Blessings in 2012.

The article C.S. Lewis and total depravity was presented February 2, 2008. I have added a new section.

Lewis and Depravity

The entire MPhil can be found in the January 2006 archives and the link below:

MPhil 2003

C.S. Lewis and Thoughts on Total Depravity

British born, Clive Staples Lewis (1898-1963) was a world renowned British writer whose theological literary works have been influential within Christian apologetics. Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, describes Lewis’ beginnings and places of study.

Anglican scholar-novelist and Christian Apologist, perhaps best known for his literary fantasies that explore theological concepts. Born near Belfast in Northern Ireland, he received his B.A. from University College, Oxford, in 1924, and was fellow and tutor in English literature at Magdalen College, Oxford, from 1925 until 1954. He then accepted the Chair of Medieval and Renaissance English at Cambridge. Hein (1996: 630).

Lewis pointed out some definite examples of human wickedness in his era and culture; however, he rejected the idea of Total Depravity. He stated:

This chapter will have been misunderstood if anyone describes it as a reinstatement of the doctrine of Total Depravity. I disbelieve the doctrine, partly on the logical grounds that if our depravity were total we should not know ourselves to be depraved, and partly because experience shows us much goodness in human nature. Lewis (1940)(1996: 61).

I can see the logic of Lewis’ point of view; however, I don’t agree with his conclusions. I will first give the comments of C.C. Ryrie and then explain my perspective.

The concept of total depravity does not mean

(1) that depraved people cannot or do not perform actions that are good in either man’s or God’s sight. But no such action can gain favor with God for salvation. Neither does it mean

(2) that fallen man has no conscience which judges between good and evil for him. But that conscience has been effected by the fall so that it cannot be a safe and reliable guide. Neither does it mean

(3) that people indulge in every form of sin or in any sin to the greatest extent possible.

Positively total depravity means that the corruption has extended to all aspects of man’s nature, to his being: and total depravity means that because of that corruption there is nothing man can do to merit saving favour with God. Ryrie (1996: 312).

I would think Lewis did not significantly understand the doctrine. Ryrie’s first point answers Lewis’ objection. The doctrine is not about humanity being so evil that no good is possible. The point is that these good works can in no way earn salvation. As well, with Ryrie’s second point, humanity could acknowledge the existence of sin and evil in them because they still had a conscience, although it was scarred. Also, the depravity is not total in the sense of every aspect of evil in people being maximized, it means instead that humanity is corrupt to the point where salvation cannot be merited.

I think Ryrie explains the concept well, and understands it, unlike Lewis. However, I wonder if human beings can commit truly good acts, like both men suggest. I would think since humanity is totally depraved that no true human good is possible. If true goodness is found in perfection, as is God, then we cannot obtain that good. Even as Christians that attempt to perform the will of God with the help of the Holy Spirit, would there not be just a little taint of sin in all our actions? It is my view that human good is likely an absence of a complete maximization of our total depravity. I, for example, may appear to be humanly good compared to a serial murderer; however, that is because the murderer has been found out as someone who has committed heinous crimes, where as Lewis pointed out with an individual, my evil can be hidden in public persona.

HEIN, R. (1996) C.S. Lewis, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

LEWIS, C.S. (1940)(1996) The Problem of Pain, San Francisco, Harper-Collins.

RYRIE, C.C. (1996) Total Depravity, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.),Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

January 3, 2012

That section from MPhil was written in 2003 and prior, obviously prior to me being a Doctor.

‘However, I wonder if human beings can commit truly good acts, like both men suggest. I would think since humanity is totally depraved that no true human good is possible. If true goodness is found in perfection, as is God, then we cannot obtain that good. Even as Christians that attempt to perform the will of God with the help of the Holy Spirit, would there not be just a little taint of sin in all our actions? It is my view that human good is likely an absence of a complete maximization of our total depravity.’

It is my deduction even as of 2012 that one in Christ would at least have to be out of the sinful flesh, as in being in spirit form in Paradise, assuming it as some type of literal actual place (Luke 23, 2 Corinthians 12 and Revelation 2), and eventually be in resurrected form (1 Corinthians 15), to be free from this taint. John Calvin makes the point in the Bondage and Liberation of the Will that purity is spoiled by a tiny blemish and implies that sin is included in every good work (in this present realm). Calvin (1543)(1996: 27). Therefore I still support those MPhil conclusions.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

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John Hick on Hell (PhD Edit)

2012-01-01T03:42:00.000-08:00

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December 24, 2011

Hell

John Hick strongly disagrees with the Augustinian tradition of an everlasting hell.[1] Within this approach, the idea that significantly free persons reject God and do not repent and follow the creator,[2] leads to a conclusion that God will issue post-mortem punishment of these people.[3] Hick reasons such a view is a product of religious imagination.[4] He writes that the everlasting hell idea has served the Christian Church well throughout history because it demonstrated the cosmic drama that separates humankind from God and Christ.[5] Hick, however, sees the fatal flaws within the view of everlasting hell as necessarily leading those who study theodicy in the modern era to reject such a doctrine.[6] He notes since everlasting punishment would not assist in soul-making that it would be unconstructive, constituting the largest part of the problem of evil.[7] Since the universe would forever contain the evil of rebellious persons, God’s creation would permanently be spoiled and ultimately a failure.[8] Clark Pinnock (1992) describes a conditional immortality view within the Four Views on Hell text by William V. Crockett.[9] Pinnock explains that reconciliation and redemption would be questionable within heaven if evil existed in hell forever.[10] Surely God would have to abolish all evil in his new creation postulates Pinnock.[11] The subject of everlasting punishment is not central,[12] and therefore as seen within this thesis is not reviewed within the theodicy work of Augustine, Plantinga, or Feinberg. Everlasting hell was connected by Hick to Augustinian and Reformed thought,[13] but arguments for or against everlasting hell are not directly related to free will or sovereignty theodicy.[14]

December 24, 2011

In contrast

I was wisely advised by my adviser not to go deeply into the subject in my PhD thesis as it would be too controversial and dangerous in the secular setting of UK/European academia. I have however discussed this subject in other posts on both blogs.

In the annihilation article on satire and theology I presented an argument against the annihilation of unregenerate post-mortem persons. This is not exhaustive and is an argument, not the argument. I have used Erickson as a source to support my premises and conclusion.

God is perfectly holy.

Erickson writes that God is totally separate from his creation. Erickson (1994: 284).

Erickson lists Exodus 15: 11, 1 Samuel 2: 2 and Isaiah 57: 15.

God is absolutely pure and good; God is not evil. Erickson (1994: 285).

Erickson lists Job 34: 12, Habakkuk 1: 13 and James 1: 13

Human beings are sinful. Due to the fall.

Jeremiah 17: 9, Romans Chapter 1-3, Romans 3: 23, Romans 6: 23.

Sin must be atoned.

God is the administrator of justice and cannot justly simply forgive sins. Erickson (1994: 816). God is equally the God of love and justice. Justice is therefore not ignored for the sake of love, as a holy God must be just.

Christ as infinite God outlasted finite sin in the atonement.

As God, Christ’s death has infinite worth. Erickson (1994: 804). As God he can atone for all finite human sin.

Christ as a perfect man was sacrificed for imperfect persons in the atonement.

As a human, Christ could redeem other humans. Erickson (1994: 804). Christ redeemed all of human nature through the atonement. Erickson (1994: 804).

Therefore:

Those outside of Christ cannot justly be annihilated as their sins are never atoned.

Further, Biblically, all persons exist port-mortem (Revelation, Chapter 20). Unfortunately, it could be reasoned that everlasting punishment exists as finite unregenerate persons continue to attempt to, in a sense, atone for their sins in hell, but can never fully cover their sins without Christ. Therefore they cannot justly be annihilated. Earthly sins are not covered, and post-mortem sins (rejecting God and related) in disembodied and resurrection states also remain uncovered.

BROWING, W.R.F. (1997) Oxford Dictionary of the Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CROCKET, WILLIAM (1992) Four Views On Hell, William Crocket (ed.),Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

[1] Hick (1970: 284).

[2] Hick (1970: 284).

[3] Hick (1970: 284).

[4] Hick (1970: 284).

[5] Hick (1970: 284).

[6] Hick (1970: 284-285).

[7] Hick (1970: 377). It can be deduced that everlasting hell is a realm that is not an aspect of God’s creation intended for human development. It would not have to be free from the problem of evil. Our present universe would be restored through Christ and the problem of evil ended. Any everlasting hell would not constitute, in our context, the largest aspect of the problem of evil.

[8] Hick (1970: 378).

[9] Pinnock in Crockett (1992: 154).

[10] Pinnock in Crockett (1992: 154).

[11] Pinnock in Crockett (1992: 154). Browning suggests everlasting hell concepts such as Hades may relate to the Christian, New Testament use of ancient myths that consisted of the ‘decent of deities to the underworld,’ such as Orpheus, Eurydice and Persephone. Christ may be understood to have descended here after his death (First Peter 3: 19). Browning (1997: 168).

[12] It is a related issue to the study of theodicy.

[13] Hick (1970: 284).

[14] Hick (1970: 284).

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John Hick Soul-Making Theodicy (PhD Edit)

2011-12-03T02:46:00.011-08:00

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Soul-Making Theodicy Definition and Introduction

In 1966 British philosopher of religion, John Hick, wrote his first edition of Evil and The God of Love. Hick sees soul-making[1] as the developmental process by which human beings become the perfected creatures that God intended.[2] This is an evolutionary process,[3] but not one that takes place naturalistically or scientifically.[4] Soul-making is a method by which human beings experience the problem of evil through hazardous disobedience to God and a willful desire to commit actions that are not always pleasing to the creator.[5] Phillips writes concerning this general type of approach, that without the existence of evil, character development would not place.[6] For Hick, the development that would take place in humanity was not one of gradual human improvement throughout generations,[7] but was instead an individual process in each and every person.[8] This type of approach allows God to mould human character.[9] Phillips views a moral development theory as incoherent,[10] as it creates an immoral indulgence of human beings to self,[11] as in their own personal development.[12] Persons should instead be more concerned with other persons reasons Phillips.[13]

Hick maintains the Irenean type of theodicy is a traditional perspective within the Christian faith that existed in its earliest days.[14] Meghan Ramsay (2004) explains that Hick attempts a theodicy within the Irenean approach, as opposed to the Augustinian one which he calls the majority report within Christian tradition.[15] Hick views the approach of Irenaeus (ca.130-ca.200)[16] as the minority report.[17] According to John C. McDowell (2005), Hick believes that an Irenean type theodicy distinguishes between the image of God and likeness of God.[18] Hick writes in Evil and the God of Love that Irenaeus viewed the image of God, which resides in the human bodily form, as representing God’s nature allowing human beings to fellowship with their creator.[19] The likeness of God was humanity’s final perfection by the work of God’s Holy Spirit.[20] Irenaeus within Against Heresies (c 175-185)(2005) did draw a distinction between image and likeness.[21] The image is a fixed nature within human beings[22] while likeness varies depending on how close a person follows God.[23] Father Anthony Zimmerman (1999) notes that to Irenaeus, the image represented the spiritual essence of an individual, while the likeness was the sanctifying presence in which a person became a son of God.[24]

Rejecting the Augustinian tradition that humanity was made perfect and then rebelled against God becoming corrupt,[25] Hick explains in his 2001 presentation found in Encountering Evil that the Irenean type of theodicy takes place in two phases.[26] In phase one God creates humanity imperfect and underdeveloped.[27] They develop over perhaps millions of years through biological evolution to possess the image of God.[28] Once humanity reaches a certain level of maturity they complete this stage and exist in the image of God.[29] When this image of God exists humanity has the potential for a relationship with their creator.[30]

According to Hick, within the second phase humanity becomes intelligent, ethical and religious.[31] It is evolving towards the likeness of God which includes achieving goodness and personal worth.[32] In the process of humanity becoming like God, soul-making can take place, but it must occur with human beings possessing significant freedom away from their creator’s direct influence.[33] Hick deduces that human beings must have an epistemic[34] distance from their maker in order to develop an uncoerced consciousness of God.[35] According to R. Douglas Geivett in his 1993 book Evil and the Evidence for God, Hick contends that if persons lived in the immediate presence of God, significant freedom to make moral choices would be precluded and thus an epistemic distance, a distance between God and created persons, must exist between humanity and God.[36] Hick’s concept of epistemic distance is an important aspect of his theodicy as human beings who possess the image of God, but an imperfect likeness, inevitably create moral evil.[37] Epistemic distance results in moral evil as human beings struggle within a hostile environment apart from God’s direct rule and guidance.[38] God is therefore not clearly and overwhelmingly evident to his creation with this view.[39]

Hick (1978) deduces in ‘Present and Future Life’ that once a human being dies a conscious personality continues to exist.[40] He concludes that for soul-making to succeed post-mortem[41] existence must include the ability to make moral and spiritual choices.[42] Robert Smid (1999) comments that Hick trusts all of humanity will complete their soul-making via the afterlife, as a loving God must desire the salvation of all people.[43] Hick believes that since God has perfect knowledge of the human heart he, in patience, would eventually succeed in bringing all persons in devotion to him.[44] Geivett reasons that for Hick, the eschatological fulfillment of God’s soul-making plan must include universal perfection of every human being made by God.[45] Hick subscribes to universalism,[46] which John Ankerberg and John Weldon (1999) write in Encyclopedia of Cults and New Religions,[47] is the theological idea that salvation is universal and therefore each person will eventually be redeemed in heaven.[48] Kreeft and Tacelli explain that universalism is universal salvation and has been considered by some well known orthodox Christians over the centuries[49] as a viable alternative to hell, although Kreeft and Tacelli reject this alternative.[50]

Author’s Viewpoints

By Hick’s definition,[51] my sovereignty theodicy position would fit within the Augustinian tradition,[52] and therefore outside of his Irenean approach.[53] In agreement with Augustine and Feinberg,[54] I would postulate that humanity from a traditional perspective was created in the image and likeness of God,[55] spiritually in tune with their creator, perfectly moral and not sinful.[56] However, I deduce that original humanity was spiritually and morally immature, and inexperienced.[57] As discussed in Chapter Three, due to lack of experience with God, the initial persons were spiritually and morally immature in relation to their creator, in comparison to what later human beings who would experience the problem of evil, atonement, and restoration would become in regard to spiritual maturity. The idea of the fall from conservative and liberal views has been discussed in Chapters Two and Three, but I would deduce that since Genesis 3 describes this event, it is plausible a literal Adam and Eve were initially morally perfect without sin and eventually fell in corruption.[58] It is also possible that the somewhat metaphorical language of Genesis[59] allows for the Adam and Eve story to be describing a fall from God’s plan for humanity in general, and not specifically two initial persons.[60] Although I do hold to a reasoned Biblical belief in Adam and Eve. I do agree with Hick that some type of soul-making is an important reason for God to willingly allow the problem of evil.[61] However, there will be points of both agreement and disagreement on how this may be completed by God.

My concept of original human immaturity is not identical to Hick’s. I accept that when in Genesis 1:26, God is said to have created humanity in his image and likeness,[62] that this was part of their original nature.[63] H.L. Ellison (1986) explains that in the beginning human beings were made in God’s image and likeness[64] in order that they could have dominion over animal creation and have communion with God.[65] If a literal explanation of Genesis 1:26 is accepted[66] then it seems plausible that both the image and likeness of God were given to humanity from the start, and I lean towards this understanding.[67] As discussed in Chapter Two, scholars such as Fretheim, La Sor, Hubbard, and Bush explain that Genesis is written with the use of metaphorical language and so an interpretation such as Hick’s, that is not literal in regard to the image and likeness of God, is an intellectual possibility.[68] Erickson thinks that Irenaeus views the image of God as being human resemblance to the creator with reason and will,[69] and the likeness of God was the moral qualities of their maker.[70] This is a reasonable understanding of Irenaeus’ view,[71] but even if this separation between image and likeness is accepted, it is plausible that the image and likeness occur in persons simultaneously.[72] I would therefore theorize that original human spiritual immaturity was not due to humanity lacking a likeness to God.[73] Rather, original people could have been created morally perfect within what Hick calls an Augustinian model.[74] I subscribe to a Reformed, Calvinistic sovereignty model, and I have explained throughout this thesis that Augustinian and Calvinistic models and traditions are similar but not identical. These persons lacked the experience to properly understand and comprehend the results of disobeying God and the sort of life that would occur because of that rebellion. The first human beings may have had little understanding of the idea that their very nature would change if they disobeyed God. Within an Augustinian or Calvinistic perspective it seems plausible humanity’s likeness to God was insufficient after, but not before, the fall as they were no longer in perfect moral communion with their God.[75]

ANKERBERG, JOHN AND JOHN WELDON (1999) Encyclopedia of Cults and New Religions, Eugene, Oregon, Harvest House Publishers.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ELLISON, H.L. (1986) ‘Genesis’, in F.F. Bruce (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FERGUSON, EVERETT (1996) ‘Irenaeus’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

FRETHEIM, TERENCE E. (1985)(2005) ‘The Suffering of God:
An Old Testament Perspective’, in Theology Today, Volume 1, Number 1, Bookreview17. Princeton, Princeton Theological Seminary.

FRETHEIM, TERENCE E. (1994) ‘Is Genesis 3 a Fall Story?’, in Word and World, Luther Seminary, pp. 144-153. Saint Paul, Luther Seminary.

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HAMILTON, VICTOR P. (1988) Handbook on the Pentateuch, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

IRENAEUS. (c 175-185)(1998) ‘Against Heresies’, in The Catholic Encyclopedia, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

IRENAEUS (c 185)(2005) Proof of Apostolic Preaching, Translated by J. Armitage Robinson, London, The Macmillan CO.

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

LA SOR, WILLIAM SANFORD, DAVID ALLAN HUBBARD, AND FREDERIC WILLIAM BUSH. (1987) Old Testament Survey, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

RAMSAY, MEGHAN (2004) ‘John Hick: ‘Evil and Soul Making’, in Philosophy of Religion, (ed.), Philip A. Pecorino, Web Surfers Caveat, Suffolk, Virginia, Philosophy of Religion.

SMID, ROBERT W. (1999) ‘John Harwood Hick, His Life’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology.

ZIMMERMAN, ANTHONY (1999) ‘In God’s Image and Likeness’, in Lifeissues.net, Kochi, Japan. Lifeissues.net.

[1] In my mind, soul-building would also be a reasonable term for this theory.

[2] Hick (1970: 292). Phillips discusses the similar idea of ‘Evil as Opportunities for Character Development.’ Phillips (2005: 56).

[3] Hick (1970: 292). It is not primarily a scientific presentation.

[4] Hick (1970: 292).

[5] Hick (1970: 292).

[6] Phillips (2005: 56).

[7] Hick (1970: 292).

[8] Hick (1970: 292).

[9] Phillips (2005: 56).

[10] Phillips (2005: 58).

[11] Phillips (2005: 58).

[12] Phillips (2005: 58).

[13] Phillips (2005: 58). In support of Hick and my own theories of human development, I reason that spiritual building need not be necessarily only self focused. For example, in Matthew 22 and Mark 12 Jesus tells the listener to love others as self. Within spiritual development one could and should seek to love and assist others.

[14] Hick (1970: 221).

[15] Ramsay (2004: 2).

[16] Ferguson (1996: 569).

[17] Ramsay (2004: 2).

[18] McDowell (2005: 1).

[19] Hick (1970: 217).

[20] Hick (1970: 217).

[21] Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book II: Chapter 34: 4). Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book II: Chapter 7: 2).

[22] Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book II: Chapter 34: 4).

[23] Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book II: Chapter 7: 2).

[24] Zimmerman (1999: 1).

[25] Hick in Davis (2001: 40-41).

[26] Hick in Davis (2001: 40-41).

[27] Hick in Davis (2001: 40-41).

[28] McDowell (2005: 1).

[29] Ramsay (2004: 2).

[30] McDowell (2005: 1).

[31] Hick in Davis (2001: 40-41).

[32] Ramsay (2004: 2).

[33] Hick in Davis (2001: 48).

[34] Epistemology is the theory of knowledge which includes origins of knowledge and the relationship between knowledge and reason. Blackburn (1996: 123).

[35] Hick in Davis (2001: 48). Phillips writes this is a distance that separates God from his created beings. Phillips (2005: 164).

[36] Geivett (1993: 36).

[37] Geivett (1993: 36).

[38] McDowell (2005: 2). Hick in Davis (2001: 48).

[39] Phillips (2005: 165).

[40] Hick (1978: 12).

[41] After death is meant.

[42] Hick (1978: 13).

[43] Smid (1999: 12).

[44] Hick (1970: 381).

[45] Geivett (1993: 36).

[46] Hick (1970: 381).

[47] The title of this text is a bit misleading as it offers more than encyclopedia type referencing for words and concepts but presents scholarly chapters on religious movements the authors view as cultic.

[48] Ankerberg and Weldon (1999: 503).

[49] This would, of course, provide another opportunity for a PhD thesis.

[50] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 286).

[51] Hick (1970: 121-143).

[52] This would be a broad perspective from Hick’s view. I would rather define my theodicy as Reformed as opposed to Augustinian. This can be deduced through the reviews in Chapters Two and Three.

[53] Hick (1970: 121-143).

[54] That have shown within this thesis to not have identical or near identical perspectives.

[55] Genesis 1:26 states God created human beings in both his image and likeness. The New American Standard Version Bible (1984: 2). Victor P. Hamilton in Handbook on the Pentateuch notes three possible reasons for the writer of Genesis using these terms together: (1) The terms image and likeness may be interchangeable, in other words synonyms for each other. (2) The word likeness may modify the word image. This is done to avoid the idea that man is an exact copy of God. (3) The term likeness amplifies the term image as human beings are not simply representative of God, but representational. Hamilton (1988: 26-27).

[56] As can be understood within Chapters Two and Three within this thesis.

[57] Even if Adam and Eve or original persons were made as mature adults they could not logically be made with experience as noted within Chapter Three.

[58] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 133-136).

[59] Fretheim (1994: 152).

[60] Fretheim (1994: 153).

[61] Hick in Davis (2001: 51).

[62] Hamilton (1982: 26-27).

[63] Hamilton (1982: 26-27).

[64] Ellison (1986: 115). Hamilton (1982: 26-27).

[65] Ellison (1986: 115).

[66] Hamilton (1982: 26-27).

[67] Ellison (1986: 115). Hamilton (1982: 26-27).

[68] Fretheim (1994: 153). La Sor, Hubbard, and Bush (1987: 72).

[69] Erickson (1994: 500-501).

[70] Erickson (1994: 500-501).

[71] Erickson (1994: 500-501). Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book IV: Chapter 39: 2).

[72] Erickson (1994: 500-501).

[73] Hamilton (1982: 26-27). Ellison (1986: 115).

[74] Hick (1970: 121-131).

[75] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Augustine (421)(1998: Chapter 13: 8). Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 2, 7). Calvin (1543)(1996: 69).

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Recently hurt my big toe doing that...temporarily switched chairs and was using one without a strong long back. My toe still hurts as it was caught under the metal desk on the way backwards, I think it is a bad bruise but cannot tell for sure.